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N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A N A S A •  U S G S  •  N O A A
• Learning from Yesterday:  On-orbit collisions are a real and 
increasing mission risk
• Where we are Today: Collision risk management requires more than 
just predicting close approaches
• Looking to Tomorrow: What challenges are anticipated in the 
future
Overview
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• Since 1957, humankind’s reliance on the space domain for military, 
humanitarian, and commercial applications has continued to increase
– 1960—first successful use of a meteorological satellite
– 1963—first use of a geosynchronous communications satellite
– 1985—Block I of GPS fielded
– 1998—first module of ISS
– 2001—first satellite radio broadcast over North America
Humankind’s Reliance on Space
3
N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A N A S A •  U S G S  •  N O A A
• Although expansive, the space domain is not limitless
• Access to space cost, desired science/mission, and physics—often in 
that order—dictate the location of a particular satellites
• Some orbit regimes have become popular destinations; for example:
– Low-Earth Orbit for Earth Observation
– Semi-Synchronous for position, navigation, and timing
– Geosynchronous for Telecommunications
Space is a Finite Resource
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• What you take into space, 
stays in space
– Launch vehicle / Rocket-
Bodies 
– Mission-related debris
• Debris can also be generated 
on-orbit
– Fuel/Battery Explosions
– Collisions
• Only naturally-occurring 
retarding effect is orbital decay 
due to atmospheric drag
– Some remediation 
measures available
– Active debris removal not 
yet viable option
One New Satellite ≠ One New Object in 
Space
Graphic from Orbital Debris Quarterly New, Volume 18, Issue 1
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• Because of our reliance on 
space and the fact that 
space really isn’t limitless, 
the “Big Sky” theory is no 
longer an acceptable risk 
posture
• There have been eight (8) 
on-orbit collision reported 
to date, half of which 
occurred in the last 10 
years
On-Orbit Collision is Real Mission Risk
Compiled by Dr. David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists, reused 
by Brian Weeden in “Billiards in space”, The Space Review
February 23, 2009.
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Collisions Exacerbate the Problem 
• The space object environment continues to incrementally increase over time
– Launches continue unabated, and are even accelerating
– Launching satellites leave other objects behind
– On-orbit failure can create additional debris
• One on-orbit phenomenon that can fundamentally increase the space object environment is 
hypervelocity impacts
– Could occur through 
intentional means
(anti-satellite demonstrations, 
like FY-1C destruction 
in 2007) or natural means 
(collisions, like Iridium-Cosmos 
collision in 2009)
• These events are rare but have 
severe consequences 
– Catastrophic loss of mission
– Significant debris generation
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• The United States maintains a 
catalog of trackable space 
objects
– Catalog maintained by the 
USAF’s Joint Space 
Operations Center (JSpOC)
– Uses non-O/O (radar and 
optical) observations from the 
Space Surveillance Network
– Current catalog > 20,000 
space objects
• Using this catalog, or other high 
accuracy space catalogs, 
predicting close approaches 
between orbiting objects is 
possible
– Process of identifying close 
approaches is called 
conjunction assessment (CA)
Collisions are Preventable
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/11/Space_Control_and_Space_Surveillance/
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• Learning from Yesterday:  On-orbit collision is a real and increasing 
mission risk
– On-orbit collisions have occurred and the risk increases with debris 
population increase
– Demand for the space environment not going away
– Debris production continues and is expected to accelerate
• Where we are Today: Collision risk management requires more than 
just predicting close approaches
• Looking to Tomorrow: What challenges do we anticipate in the 
future
Checkpoint #1
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CA is the First Step
Conjunction Assessment (CA) is the 
process of identifying close approaches 
between two orbiting objects; sometimes 
called conjunction “screening”
The CARA detachment at the Joint 
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) 
screens CARA-supported assets against 
the catalog, assists with OD and tasking for 
identified conjunctions, and generates 
close approach data
CA Risk Analysis (CARA) is the process 
of assessing collision risk and assisting 
with maneuver planning to mitigate that 
risk, if warranted
The CARA Team at NASA-GSFC provides 
CARA for all NASA operational robotic 
satellites, as well as a service provider for 
some other external agency/organizations
∆V
Collision Avoidance (COLA) is the 
process of executing mitigation actions, 
typically in the form of an orbital 
maneuver, to reduce collision risk due to 
a conjunction
Each satellite Owner/Operator (O/O) –
mission management, flight dynamics, 
and flight operations – are responsible for 
making maneuver decisions and 
executing the maneuvers 
   dAeP A
XX
c   1T212/1det2 1
C
C
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• A typical CA process produces necessary but not sufficient information for 
determining whether to maneuver a satellite
– Typically receive the state and state uncertainty (covariance) of both 
objects at time of closes approach (TCA)
– Data provides directly the miss distance and indirectly the uncertainty of 
that prediction
• This information can be used to calculate the primary risk metric, the 
Probability of Collision (Pc)
– In addition to states and covariance, 
also need estimate for the sizes of the 
objects (the hard-body radius, HBR)
• What the Pc tells you …
– Given the uncertainty in the predicted object states (as described by the 
covariance), the Pc is likelihood that the actual miss distance is less than 
what would cause physical contact (as described by the HBR)
Are they going to hit or not?
   dAeP A
XX
c   1T212/1det2 1
C
C
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• So, CA + Pc = collision risk management?  Wrong.
• What the Pc doesn’t tell you …
– Do I believe the mean estimates of the objects’ positions?
– Do I believe the uncertainty estimates about those means?
– How likely are the current state estimates and uncertainties to 
change significantly?
– Is the conjunction likely to be substantially affected by atmospheric 
density mismodeling?
– Is a risk mitigation maneuver necessary?
– Which direction should I maneuver and what magnitude?
– Will this maneuver create high-risk situations with other objects?
Risk Management isn’t just Pc
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• In 2005, NASA established 
Agency-wide policy for 
performing CA and reacting to 
close approaches
– Required for all operational 
robotic (unmanned) NASA 
satellites
– Similar effort for protecting 
human spaceflight (Shuttle, 
ISS) since early 1990s
• The Conjunction Assessment 
Risk Analysis (CARA) was 
stood up to offer this service 
to all NASA robotic satellites
– Currently provides service 
to ~70 operational satellites
NASA’s Process:  CARA
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Analysts
• Has processed over 1,000,000 close approach messages and 
assisted with about 100 avoidance maneuvers
CARA’s Operational Pedigree 
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CARA Still Evolving
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• Use combined resources in cost-constrained environment to: 
– Keep up with policy changes
– Maintain single interfaces with other cost-constrained organizations
– Stay abreast of advances and initiatives within community
– Perform R&D to advance state of the art
– Bring more capability than available to one O/O individually
– Build operations experience more quickly, learning from operational 
situations
– Maintain corporate knowledge despite launch manifest ebbs and 
flows
– Identify industry-wide trends extracted from very large database of 
CA information
Centralizing Expertise
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• Learning from Yesterday:  On-orbit collisions is a real and 
increasing mission risk
• Where we are Today: Collision risk management requires more than 
just predicting close approaches
– Responding to collision risk is more than just data
– Requires understanding of predicting close approaches and 
capabilities/limitations of missions
– NASA CARA process stood up to help Agency but still evolving
– Centralizing expertise creates efficiencies
• Looking to Tomorrow: What challenges do we anticipate in the 
future
Checkpoint #2
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• The planned S-band Space Fence will significantly improve the SSN’s 
ability to track smaller debris objects
– Currently estimated to increase space catalog by order of 
magnitude
• Currently we analyze, and if necessary remediate, each close 
approach discretely
• With substantially larger catalog, individual analysis of discrete events 
no longer possible
• R&D effort to determinate alternative approaches
– Analysis and remediation based on grouped data and aggregated 
Pc values
– Direct modeling of satellite to reduce HBR sizes
– Better mapping of uncertainties through entire process
Substantially Expanded Catalog
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• Not all satellites are equipped with conventional propulsion systems, 
and many with no propulsion systems at all
• Having no impulsive orbital maneuverability limits mitigation actions
• Other options do exist
– Reducing cross-sectional area presentation to incoming object
– Affecting orbit through drag profile modifications
– Turning off or varying electric propulsion continuous thrust
• Whether this will be effective in most operational situations is an 
open question
To Maneuver or Not to Maneuver
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• Smallsats are becoming more and more popular due to relatively low 
launch and operating costs
– Can be built “from a kit” and operated by novice users
– Can be co-hosted on launch vehicles or deployed from ISS
• CubeSats present CA challenges
– Often deployed in “clusters,” with long separation times 
– Some cubesats are too small to be tracked reliably, and O/Os often 
do not produce high-fidelity predicted ephemerides
– Deployment to high-drag orbit regimes only compounds position 
prediction problem
– Often have no propulsion capability and thus no ability to remediate 
conjunctions
– Amateur operators may lack ability or impetus to take CA seriously
CubeSats
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• Spacecraft collocation and systematic conjunctions are special breed 
of close approach
– Potential for repeated and long-term recurrence
• Many systematic conjunctions can be avoided
– Such scenarios can be predicted and therefore avoided during 
mission design
• More of a coordination and management effort than technical
• Proposed concepts such as an Orbital Registry could affect this
– Would function like the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) but would apply to all orbit regimes
– Would examine proposed orbits for repeating conjunction 
vulnerability and recommend alternatives
– Concept floated but remains paper-ware
Collocation
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• Many different atmospheric density models exist, but all are empirical
– Employ semi-analytic approaches and curve-fitting
• New atmospheric density model (JBH09) deployed recently at JSpOC
– Past densities extracted from calibration satellite orbits
– Future densities predicted from 11 solar EUV indices
– Solar storm active compensation capability
• Despite improved functionality, still is an empirical model, which will 
limit its predictive power
– Imposes limit to fidelity of CA solutions in many situations
• Only method for substantial improvement is physics-based model, 
which attempts to model the actual processes of atmospheric heating
– Several efforts attempted in past, but none have come to fruition
Predicting the Sun
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• Learning from Yesterday:  On-orbit collisions is a real and 
increasing mission risk
• Where we are Today: Collision risk management requires more than 
just predicting close approaches
• Looking to Tomorrow: What challenges do we anticipate in the 
future
– Large-scale catalog growth
– CubeSats
– Collocation and Systematic conjunctions
– Physics-based solar model
Checkpoint #3
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• Orbital Debris is an international problem
– Affects safety of flight for all operators
– Collaboration and data sharing are essential to addressing the 
issue
Conclusion
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